Do tightenings of bank lending standards permanently reduce bank lending? We construct a measure of a bank's level of lending standards using micro-data from the sample of banks participating in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands and show that this level measure a¤ects business lending. The level e¤ect is statistically robust and economically relevant; a one point tightening reduces a bank's quarterly growth rate of business lending by about half a percentage point until bank lending standards are eased. This level e¤ect of bank lending standards helps to explain low bank lending growth after a period of prolonged tightening as well as high bank lending growth in a period of prolonged easing. As such, the analysis provides another potential indicator for macroprudential policy.
The Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey is an important source of information for monetary policymakers in the euro area to understand changes in credit conditions and gain better insight into future economic developments. It is a quarterly survey among a representative sample of around 90 banks from all euro area countries, and the European equivalent of the quarterly Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey that the Federal Reserve conducts in the United States. The survey asks senior loan o¢ cers about bank-speci…c developments in lending standards and credit demand.
A key observation from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey is the prolonged period of tightening of lending standards on business lending by banks across Europe during the 2007-09 …nancial crisis ( Figure 1 ). In that period, every quarter, a considerable share of European banks tightened their lending standards. Since then, on balance, banks have not eased lending standards. From this observation it seems natural to conclude that bank lending standards in Europe are still tight, limiting business lending for a given level of loan demand.
In academic and policy circles, however, it is often questioned whether the survey questions and reported quarterly changes in bank lending standards should be taken literally. For example, Del Giovane et al. (2011) argue that banks provide answers that are inconsistent with the formulation of the question they are asked; instead of reporting a change in lending standards over the past three months, banks report the "degree of tightness" compared to some benchmark. The European Central Bank (ECB) seems to interpret the survey responses in a similar way, concluding from the 2013Q1 survey results (see …nal point in Figure 1 ) that bank lending standards in Europe are, in fact, not particularly tight:
"The level of net tightening of credit standards for loans to enterprises in the …rst quarter of 2013 currently stands below its historical average calculated over the period since the start of the survey in 2003"(ECB, 2013).
Thus, depending on the interpretation of the survey results, a di¤erent, even opposite, conclusion on the strictness of bank lending standards in Europe can be reached. This paper advocates a literal reading of bank lending surveys such as those conducted in the euro area, United States and Japan. In particular, we propose an intuitive approach of constructing a bank-speci…c measure for the (cumulated) level of bank lending standards from the survey answers, and examine whether this level measure a¤ects business lending. The basic assumption underlying 1 our measure for the level of a bank's lending standards is that a reported tightening is (only) o¤set by a reported easing of standards, and vice versa. Using micro-data on the sample of banks that participate in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands, the results show that a one point increase in the level of a bank's lending standards -i.e. a bank reports a tightening -reduces the bank's quarterly growth rate of business lending in the range of .5 percentage points; equivalent to about 2 percentage points in annualized terms. Importantly, this result should be interpreted as a permanent e¤ect -until bank lending standards are eased -and comes on top of the one-o¤ e¤ect of a tightening of standards found by Del Giovane et al. (2011) .
The …nding of a level e¤ect of bank lending standards helps to explain high bank lending growth in a period of prolonged easing and low bank lending growth after a period of prolonged tightening of standards. To illustrate this, we perform counterfactual analyses for business lending in The Netherlands -holding the level of bank lending standards constant -in the period before and since the 2007-09 …nancial crisis. The results suggest that due to looser bank lending standards, business lending growth was about 4 percentage points higher in the years prior to the crisis. In turn, due to tighter bank lending standards since 2009, the current annual growth rate of business lending in The Netherlands is subdued by about 3 percentage points.
The counterfactual scenarios illustrate that our survey-based estimate for the level e¤ect of bank lending standards is relevant at the macro-level. As such, they provide analysis for another potential indicator for macroprudential policy. Several authors (i.e. Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehmann, 2009 ) have identi…ed strong credit growth, and in particular a large credit-to-GDP gap, as an early warning indicator of …nancial crises. 1 Also, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) show evidence indicating that countries with softer bank lending standards due to low monetary policy rates prior to the 2007-09 …nancial crisis, experienced a worse economic performance afterwards. Moreover, the IMF (2013) identi…es "erosion of lending standards" as one of the factors that can contribute to credit booms and too much risk taking by …nancial institutions, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the system. Our survey-based measure of the level of bank lending standards can be of use to track these developments, although it is subject to the Lucas critique; the relationship between bank lending and lending standards might change once policymakers base their actions on it.
We estimate a standard panel data model with bank-speci…c and time …xed e¤ects to identify the level e¤ect of bank lending standards. Our approach builds on the model by Del Giovane et al. (2011) which uses micro-level survey results on changes in bank lending standards and credit demand to disentangle supply and demand e¤ects on credit developments. Importantly, we extend their model in two ways. First, we add two novel bank-speci…c level variables; one measuring the level of bank lending standards, and one for the level of credit demand. Second, we include bank-speci…c interest rates on new loans. As such, our …nding of a "level e¤ect" relates to the in ‡uence of non-price bank lending standards (i.e. collateral requirements, non-interest rate charges, covenants etc.) on business lending, and con…rms the idea that banks rely more heavily on non-price rationing of loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) .
Our micro-data covers the survey responses, loan quantities and prices, for the eight banks that participated in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands in the period from 2003Q1 to 2013Q2. Although we use information on a relatively small and unbalanced sample, the level e¤ect is robust within a large variety of even smaller subsamples, an alternative weighing scheme for "somewhat" and "considerable" changes when constructing the level variables, and other speci…cation changes. Also, we …nd no evidence that the level e¤ect is statistically di¤erent during the 2007-09 crisis, pre-or post-crisis period, or asymmetric between tightenings and easings of standards.
So far, there has been little attempt in the literature to identify the level e¤ect of bank lending standards on bank lending. Del Giovane et al. (2011), using micro-data on the sample of banks participating in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in Italy, examine a speci…cation with a measure for the cumulated level of bank lending standards that di¤ers from ours but …nd no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on business lending when including bank-speci…c and time …xed e¤ects. Lown and Morgan (2006) and Basset et al. (2012) show that a shock in standards in the United States is followed by a decline in the aggregate volume of loans until banks start to ease standards again. Our …nding of a level e¤ect of bank lending standards is related, but is identi…ed at the micro-level and shows that a bank's level of standards has a persistent impact on its growth rate of lending. Finally, a number of authors study the link between the level of bank lending standards and consumption In what follows, we discuss the empirical methodology, data, and our measure of the level of bank lending standards (Section 2). In Section 3, we present the benchmark results, followed by a discussion and robustness analysis in Section 4. Section 5 provides two counterfactual analyses for business lending in The Netherlands and discusses implications of the prolonged period of easing of bank lending standards before, and tightening since, the 2007-09 …nancial crisis. Section 6 concludes.
Empirical Methodology and Data

Model Speci…cation
We examine if the level of bank lending standards has an e¤ect on the growth rate of the stock of loans to businesses. This "level e¤ect" is a separate factor that in ‡uences credit growth aside from changes in bank lending standards. The intuition behind this link between the level of a bank's lending standards and the growth in the bank's loan portfolio runs as follows.
Let the stock of outstanding loans by bank i at time t be given by S it . Newly extended loans to businesses by bank i in period t are given by L it . The cohort-structure of the loans implies that a fraction i < 1 of S it survives until next period. The survival rate i is determined by redemptions and defaults on outstanding loans. The dynamics of the stock of outstanding loans S is given by:
From equation (1), it follows that the growth rate of outstanding loans is equal to:
According to equation (2), the growth rate of outstanding loans of an individual bank depends on the bank-speci…c survival rate i of the loans in the portfolio and on the amount of newly extended loans as a fraction of the total loan portfolio in the previous period. We argue that the fraction of newly extended loans depends on the change in and "level" of bank lending standards. For example, higher (more strict) bank lending standards result in a higher rejection rate of loan applications for a given level of loan demand. So, not only the most recent adjustment of bank lending standards determine the growth rate of the loan portfolio, but also all previous changes that make up the current level of standards. This is formalized in equation (3):
where BLS_S represents changes in bank lending standards, and BLS_S_level is the level of bank lending standards. Since we are interested in the level e¤ect of bank lending standards for a given level of credit demand, we include in our econometric speci…cation two level indicators: one for bank lending standards and one for credit demand. Aside from these novel level variables, we follow the approach taken by Del Giovane et al. (2011) and add a set of dummy variables measuring speci…c changes in bank lending standards and credit demand. We include the level variables with a two-quarter lag in order to prevent double counting of the e¤ect of a change in bank lending standards or credit demand; once by the one-quarter lagged dummy variable for the respective change and once by the level variable. In addition, we include bank-speci…c interest rates on new loans such that the "level e¤ect" of bank lending standards relates to the in ‡uence on business lending of non-price conditions. Combining equations (2) and (3) then implies that the growth rate l it of loans by bank i in quarter t can be written as:
where D i captures bank …xed e¤ects and D t are time …xed e¤ects. 'X' is a vector of variables that includes dummy variables for speci…c changes in a bank's lending standards (i.e. "eased considerably", "eased somewhat", "tightened somewhat", and "tightened considerably") and changes in bank-speci…c credit demand (i.e. "decreased considerably", "decreased somewhat", "increased somewhat", and "increased considerably"). IR is the bank-speci…c interest rates on new loans. 2 captures the level e¤ect of credit demand.
The parameter of interest is 1 . This represents the level e¤ect of bank lending standards on the quarterly growth rate of bank lending. It is identi…ed within bank variation over time and should be interpreted as a permanent e¤ect. We include bank-speci…c …xed e¤ects to account for bank-speci…c factors that may a¤ect the growth rate of bank loans, such as the maturity structure and the credit quality of the loan portfolio. Moreover, our benchmark speci…cation includes time-speci…c …xed e¤ects to capture the macroeconomic situation and other e¤ects that change over time and a¤ect all banks equally. Demand for credit, to the extent that it is driven by macroeconomic factors, is included in the time-speci…c e¤ect. The time …xed e¤ects also absorb the in ‡uence of supply factors that a¤ect bank loans equally across banks, e.g. if a macroeconomic downturn increases economy-wide credit risk and banks are more reluctant to lend, this e¤ect will be captured by the time dummy.
Bank-Speci…c Data on Business Lending and Bank Lending Standards
We examine the level e¤ect of bank lending standards on the quarterly growth rate of lending to non-…nancial …rms in The Netherlands. The individual bank data are con…dential, but were kindly The data on bank lending standards are taken from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey, which was introduced in 2003. 3 Every quarter, banks in the euro area are asked about changes in their lending standards and credit demand. Our benchmark model includes the information from the two 6 general questions in the survey on developments in lending standards and credit demand for loans to enterprises, which allow us to examine whether there is a level e¤ect of bank lending standards. 4 These "standards" refer to both price and non-price lending terms, such as collateral requirements, non-interest rate charges, loan limits, covenants and maturity. Since we include bank-speci…c interest rates in the benchmark model, the "level e¤ect" relates to non-price bank lending terms.
Banks answer the question on the change in lending standards by choosing from a scale of …ve answers: "tightened considerably", "tightened somewhat", "basically unchanged", "eased somewhat"
or "eased considerably". Likewise, the question on the change in credit demand involves …ve answering categories: "decreased considerably", "decreased somewhat", "basically unchanged", "increased somewhat" or "increased considerably". to have been tightened than eased, which is largely due to the crisis period. Similarly, since the crisis the balance has shifted towards more reporting of credit demand decreases than increases. Finally, banks seldom report a considerable change in either lending standards or credit demand; they never reported a considerable easing of lending standards.
A Survey-Based Measure of the Level of Bank Lending Standards
The novel part of the data set is our measure of a bank's level of lending standards and credit demand.
We use the individual responses of the banks participating in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands to construct these level variables. The idea is straightforward: since banks are asked to report changes in lending standards over the past three months, the quarterly reported changes cumulate over time. For example, if a bank reports a tightening at t + 1 and again at t + 2, the level of the bank's lending standards at t + 2 > t + 1 > t.
We construct the variable for the level of a bank's lending standards by coding the qualitative answers given in the Bank Lending Survey as follows:
& lending standards at t are "tightened"
& lending standards at t are "unchanged" as "-1", and a "0" is given when credit demand did not change.
Our benchmark measure for a bank's level of lending standards (or credit demand) makes no distinction in the degree of tightening or easing; the categories "considerably" and "somewhat" are treated equally. Admittedly, this approach is arbitrary, but it is in line with the main measure used by the ECB to describe developments of survey replies over time, i.e. the "net percentage" of changes in aggregate bank lending standards (see for more details Berg et al. 2005 ). The ECB also reports a "di¤usion index" where the response option "considerably" is given a weight twice as high as the response option "somewhat" (see i.e. ECB, 2013). We show below that our main …nding of a level e¤ect of bank lending standards is robust to such an alternative weighing scheme. We also examine whether the level e¤ect di¤ers between tightenings and easings of bank lending standards.
Benchmark Results
The results of estimating the baseline speci…cation are presented in the …rst column of Table 1 . We also show an alternative speci…cation with constraints on the one-o¤ e¤ects of di¤erent changes in standards and credit demand. Both speci…cations are estimated with bank and quarter …xed e¤ects.
Before we discuss the level e¤ect of bank lending standards, we brie ‡y go into the impact on business lending of the conditioning variables. The results indicate that when banks tighten their lending standards "considerably", the quarterly growth rate of business lending decreases by as much as 3.9 percentage points (relative to "basically unchanged"); about 1.5 percentage points more Turning to our main variable of interest: the level of banking lending standards appears to in ‡uence the growth rate of business lending. The estimate for the level e¤ect of bank lending standards is negative and di¤erent from zero at any reasonable signi…cance level. Further, the size of the "level e¤ect" is economically relevant. It shows that a one point increase in the level of a bank's lending standards -i.e. a bank reports to have tightened its lending standards "somewhat"
or "considerably" -permanently reduces its quarterly growth rate of business lending by about .5
percentage points (equivalent to about 2 percentage points in annualized terms).
The speci…cation in the second column of Table 1 provides a …rst sensitivity check by using an alternative approach to account for the one-o¤ e¤ects of changes in bank lending standards and credit demand. Instead of using dummy variables for the various answering categories, we construct one bank lending standards indicator and one credit demand indicator, following the approach by Del Giovane et al. (2011) . The bank lending standards indicator has a value of 1 to 5, corresponding to answers ranging from eased "considerably" (1) to tightened "considerably" (5) . Likewise, the credit demand indicator ranges from decreased "considerably" (1) to increased "considerably" (5) . for supervisory reasons might well balance out against the incentive to limit public discontent.
Fourth, our empirical strategy to identify a level e¤ect of bank lending standards relies on changes over time in the bank-speci…c level variable. So, any bias against reporting a change in lending standards (whether this bias is against tightening or easing) works against …nding a level e¤ect of bank lending standards on business lending.
Robustness of Level E¤ect
Is the …nding of a level e¤ect of bank lending standards on business lending fragile? Do small changes to the sample or speci…cation strongly in ‡uence the level e¤ect? We provide a battery of robustness checks in Table 2 to show that our main …nding is basically insensitive to reasonable changes to the sample and adjustments to the speci…cation. Each of the rows in Table 2 corresponds to a di¤erent sensitivity check. We only report the estimate for the level e¤ect; all speci…cations include the controls, bank and quarter …xed e¤ects, as in our benchmark model. Table 2 show that the …nding of a level e¤ect of bank lending standards is not due to a particular bank. The size of the level e¤ect slightly varies over these subsamples, ranging between .4 and .6.
We continue with the sample sensitivity analysis by dropping groups of banks with a common characteristic. We consider three tests. First, since the 2007-09 …nancial crisis there is growing evidence that foreign banks reduced lending more compared to domestic banks (see i.e. Claessens and Van Horen, 2013). To examine whether our …nding of a level e¤ect of bank lending standards is due to foreign banks, we drop the two foreign banks from our sample. The results show that the level e¤ect remains resilient ( Next, we examine the sensitivity to speci…cation changes. First, we test the sensitivity of the level e¤ect to an alternative weighing scheme for reported changes in bank lending standards. Instead of 11 treating the response categories "considerably" and "somewhat" equally, we now give "considerable" changes (tightenings and easings) twice as high a weight as "somewhat" changes. The level variable for credit demand is adjusted in the same way. Table 2 row 12 shows that the level e¤ect of bank lending standards is resilient to this alternative weighing scheme for the level variables.
Further, we examine whether our …nding holds when we apply a weighted panel regression, where every bank is weighted according to its share in the aggregate volume of business lending. The results in row 13 of Table 2 again con…rm the level e¤ect of bank lending standards. The size of the e¤ect is somewhat larger than our benchmark estimate, but not statistically di¤erent.
Continuing, our benchmark model includes the level variables with a two-quarter lag. This approach was taken to prevent counting the e¤ect of a change in bank lending standards or credit demand twice; once by the one-quarter lagged dummy variable for the respective change, and once by the level variable. Finally, we check the sensitivity of the level e¤ect when including the lagged dependent variable.
This way, the speci…cation accounts for possible lending dynamics in quarterly business lending. The coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable is small (.02) and not statistically signi…cant. Importantly, once more the level e¤ect of bank lending standards is robust; the size being slightly larger than our benchmark estimate (see …nal row of Table 2 ).
To sum up, we conclude from the various sensitivity checks that the level e¤ect of bank lending standards is relatively robust to reasonable changes in the sample and speci…cation. Banks with a higher level of bank lending standards seem to have permanently lower growth of business lending.
The size of the level e¤ect is somewhat sensitive to the sample or speci…cation chosen, ranging between .4 and .7; overall close to and not statistically di¤erent from our benchmark estimate of .5.
Asymmetry
Did the level e¤ect change since the 2007-09 …nancial crisis? Is the level e¤ect of tightenings versus easings of bank lending standards di¤erent? We now examine both these types of possible asymmetry in the level e¤ect of bank lending standards.
First, we test whether the level e¤ect is di¤erent during the crisis, pre-or post-crisis period. We de…ne the crisis as the period from 2007Q3 to 2009Q4. 6 Subsequently, we create a dummy variable for the crisis, pre-and post-crisis period, and interact each dummy variable with the level variables for bank lending standards and credit demand. The results are presented in Table 3 column 1. We …nd a statistically signi…cant level e¤ect of bank lending standards in all three periods. Moreover, test results reveal that the size of the level e¤ect is not statistically di¤erent between periods.
Second, we examine whether the level e¤ect is the same for tightening versus easing of bank lending standards. We add two interaction terms to our benchmark model; one between the level variable of bank lending standards and a dummy for tightenings, and one interacted with a dummy for easings. Likewise, we include two interaction terms between the level of credit demand and a dummy variable for increases and one for decreases in demand. The results in Table 3 column 2 show that neither of the two interaction terms of bank lending standards is statistically di¤erent from zero;
the level e¤ect appears to be symmetric between tightenings and easings of standards.
Overall, we …nd no evidence indicative of asymmetry in the level e¤ect of bank lending standards.
The level e¤ect is not statistically di¤erent before, during and after the …nancial crisis period, or between tightenings and easings of standards.
Counterfactual Analyses
The …nding of a level e¤ect of bank lending standards implies that after a prolonged period of tightening, such as during the 2007-09 …nancial crisis, bank lending growth is subdued. Likewise, the level e¤ect could help to explain high bank lending growth in a period of prolonged easing of standards, such as prior to the crisis. This raises the question of whether our micro-level estimate for the level e¤ect of bank lending standards is economically relevant at the macro-level.
In this Section, we attempt to quantify the level e¤ect of bank lending standards on business lending in The Netherlands both before and since the 2007-09 …nancial crisis. We do so by performing 13 two counterfactual analyses. The …rst scenario demonstrates the impact of the level of bank lending standards on business lending in the period of easing of standards before the crisis. The second scenario focuses on the period of subdued credit growth since the crisis.
In order to generate a prediction in the counterfactual scenarios for business lending at the macrolevel, we use the estimated coe¢ cients from the weighted panel regression (see Table 2 , Row 13). In this weighted panel regression each bank is weighted according to its share in the total outstanding volume of loans issued by all banks in the sample. The presented annual (rolling four-quarter) growth rate at the macro-level, then, equals the weighted sum of the predicted bank-speci…c growth rates.
The Level E¤ect of Looser Bank Lending Standards Before the Crisis
In the …rst counterfactual scenario we aim to isolate the level e¤ect of bank lending standards on business lending in The Netherlands in the pre-crisis period. We do so by comparing the actual growth rate of business lending with a prediction based on a counterfactual scenario in which the level of bank lending standards did not change after a certain date. We choose 
The Level E¤ect of Stricter Bank Lending Standards Since the Crisis
In this second counterfactual analysis, our aim is to isolate the level e¤ect of bank lending standards in the period since the crisis. Again, we compare the actual growth rate of business lending with a prediction based on a counterfactual scenario in which the level of bank lending standards did not change after a certain date. We choose 2008Q4 as the quarter after which we hold the level of bank lending standards constant for each bank. By that time, most banks had tightened their standards about …ve times from the low levels reached in 2006, and the aggregate annual growth rate of business lending was close to its long-term average of 7% (see the dotted line in Figure 4) .
A particular issue that comes up in the post-crisis counterfactual scenario is the take over and split-up of one major bank in 2010. As a result, this bank was replaced in the bank lending survey by one large and two smaller banks. In the counterfactual scenario we let the three new banks inherit the major bank's level of bank lending standards and of credit demand as of 2010Q1.
The results of the post-crisis counterfactual analysis are presented in the right panel of Figure 4 .
The grey line presents the counterfactual prediction in case the level of bank lending standards would not have changed after the …nal quarter of 2008. In that scenario, current annual business lending growth would have been close to 4%; about 3 percentage points higher than the actual growth rate.
Overall, these results suggest that the persistently low growth rate of business lending in The Netherlands since the 2007-09 …nancial crisis can for a signi…cant part be attributed to stricter bank lending standards. Due to the prolonged period of tightening, and limited easing so far, bank lending standards in The Netherlands are still relatively tight, restricting business lending growth for a given level of loan demand. This is not to say that depressed demand is not a limiting factor either.
Indeed, the long-run average growth rate of business lending is about 7% annually, still well above the prediction in our post-crisis counterfactual scenario.
Conclusion
In this paper we examine the link between the level of bank lending standards and business lending We close with some general remarks on our survey-based measure for a bank's level of lending standards. First, the level measure does not say anything about the absolute level of bank lending standards at a certain point in time. Quantitative information on speci…c standards, for example on bank loan covenants (Demiroglu and James, 2010), would be needed to do so. Second, although we …nd this unlikely, the …nding of a level e¤ect based on survey data might be peculiar to our sample, which covers the banks that participate in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands.
Finally, our goal here is to show that the level e¤ect of bank lending standards on bank lending can be identi…ed using this survey-based measure of overall lending terms. We did not delve into the survey questions on the factors driving changes in standards or the conditions and terms involving a change. Examining the level e¤ect of bank lending standards along these lines could be a promising direction for future research. :51 (:08) :47 (:12) Level of credit demand (t-2)
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:48 (1) is our benchmark. In speci…cation (2) we use an alternative approach to account for the one-o¤ e¤ects of changes in bank lending standards, and changes in credit demand. Instead of using dummy variables for the various answering categories, speci…cation (2) applies an ordinal scale to the various possible answers to each question. The "bank lending standards indicator" ranges from 1 (eased considerably) to 5 (tightened considerably), and the "credit demand indicator" ranges from 1 (decreased considerably) to 5 (increased considerably). 
